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This paper deals with the fact that we cannot experience large organizations
directly, in the same way as we can experience individuals or small groups, and
that this non-experientiability has certain implications for our scientific theories
of organizations. Whereas a science is animated by a constructive interplay of
theory concepts and experience concepts, the study of organizations has been
confined to theory concepts alone. Implications of this analysis for developing a
science of organizations are considered.
Introduction 
z
In science, as everywhere else, seeing is believing. According to James
( 1911 ), science consists in the substitution of a conceptual order for the
perceptual order of experience. Russell (1921) insisted that scientific
theory should be founded upon perceptual experience of some kind. In
his terms, ’knowledge by description’ presupposes ’knowledge by
acquaintance’. To put this principle most colourfully, Wheelwright (1962)
described the aim of theory as being to ’chop at the joints’ - that is, to
mark off resemblances and differences where experience says it is most
natural to do so.
For the field of organization studies, this principle is an embarrassment.
Organizations cannot be perceived. and therefore cannot be unambigu-
. ously theorized. To the question: ’What is organization theory about’~’
there is no easy or ready reply. The research literature offers a dismaying
multiplicity of possibilities, not one of which is recognizably definitive.
To some authors organization theory is about bureaucracy, to others it
is about systems of information and/or energy, to others it is about popu-
lations of social forms, to still others it is about modes of exchange (e.g.
markets, hierarchies, and clans), and to still others, it is about patterns
of meaning or culture. These stopgaps are questionable in the same meas-
ure ; for about systems, markets, hierarchies, clans and cultures, there
is an equal ration of indefiniteness. Disagreement is possible because
perceptive experience offers little to agree about.
In this article, we show how the absence of perceptive experience of
organizations makes it difficult to theorize about them scientifically. In
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fundamental respects, ours is an exposition and application of contem-
porary ethnomethodological critiques of social science (e.g., Garfinkel
1967; 1988; Hilbert 1990) to the field of organization studies. Parallelling
those critiques, we argue that scientific conceptualization of organizations
must be premised on phenomenological insights. Whereas science comes
to life in the dynamic opposition of phenomenal experience and explana-
tion ; in the absence of this opposition, it dissipates to a desultory exercise
of hopes. The fact that the ’organization’ conforms to no definite experi-
ence (i.e., that it cannot be perceived, nor even imagined) means that
the study of organizations is deprived of this life-giving dynamic. Perhaps
the clearest sign of this is the strange inversion of discourse that occurs
in organization studies where, amidst the lively discussion of concepts
and theories, there is barely a whisper about how organizations should
be conceived or operationalized. Finally, we discuss the prospects for a
science of organizations and what might be done to improve them.
Organizations in Doubt
We find it natural to speak of organizations as objects in action. Indeed,
our language is built upon a grammar of object and predicate (to the
chagrin of advocates of a more fluid language of process, e.g., Whitehead
1933; Giddens 1979). Even though grammatical form is not the same
thing as phenomenal form, we are likely to mistake the two when there
is no concrete experience to keep them separate. As Wittgenstein (1953:
42-49) pointed out, our problems of thought are primarily grammatical.
A ’main source of our failure to understand’, he wrote, ’is that we do
not command a clear view of the use of our words’.
Uncertain Substance
The problems of studying organizations begin with the difficulty of
pointing them out - to gesture and say, This is an organization.’ This
contrasts with the natural sciences where gesturing and saying are often
easier and more convincing. Pointing makes definition easy because it
frees us from having to translate what we can see into words. However,
in the case of organizations, there is nothing obvious to point to, or to
exclaim about. The word ’organization’ names something that cannot be
seen, and thus that cannot otherwise be confirmed as an object.
To be sure, the research literature on organizations offers almost no hint
that this is, or could be, a problem. Although it is sometimes acknow-
ledged that the boundaries of organizations are problematic (e.g., Katz
and Kahn 1978; Weick 1979), there is little question that organizations
are genuine objects. The overwhelming majority of empirical studies
report no difficulties of identification or measurement. For example, in
the last 5 years (1986-1990) of the Administrative Science Quarterly, a
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well-known and respected journal of empirical research on organizations,
we counted 85 studies which referred to over 204,000 organizations or
units thereof, ranging from Fortune 500 corporations to Finnish newspa-
pers to small convenience stores to school districts and classes. Not one of
these voices a serious misgiving about the existence of the organization(s)
under study. Only two of these studies suggest that the idea of organiza-
tion could be empirically problematic. Barnett and Carroll (1987) analyze
the structure of competition and mutualism among early phone compan-
ies in Southeast Iowa and find that the dynamics of selection are based
on communities of organizations, not individual organizations. Fiol
(1989) notes that in letters to corporate shareholders, chemical compan-
ies that are engaged in joint ventures with other companies speak about
their identity in more uncertain terms, and have a less well-defined sense
of their external boundaries (although their sense of internal boundaries
may be enhanced). However, even in these cases, there is no suggestion
that the concept of organization should be abandoned, or indeed that it
does not refer to an actual entity. The ’fact’ of organization is sure
enough for research to proceed.
This raises the question of how researchers ’know’ organizations when
they cannot see them, and when they cannot deduce them from things
that they can see. In most instances, organizations are identified by their
legal standing (e.g., articles of association or incorporation filed with
local, state, or national governments, charters, filings with Security and
Exchange Commissions, or named parties to contracts). Indeed, in the
typical research study, a sample of organizations is chosen from a list
of such entities (e.g., the Fortune 500, trade publications, government
records). In other instances, organizations such as strategic business
units, departments, or manufacturing plants, are defined by their formal
place or position within larger organizational systems. This legal or posi-
tional abstraction then serves as a point of reference which can be used
to locate and coordinate elements of the organization (e.g., employees,
assets, physical plant, roles, rules) which, unlike the abstraction, can be
observed and quantified. These elements are united by the assumption
that they refer to the same abstraction.
This manoeuver establishes the idea of an organization within a concep-
tual framework of law or a formal structure, and it establishes the ele-
mentary contents of the organization, but it does not establish the organ-
ization itself as an object or substance. When we look for organizations,
all we see are its presumed pieces (e.g., a leader, co-workers, a building
or two, actions taken, suppliers, clients, products, a logo or advertising
jingle, a retirement plan). Instead of an image of the organization, we
have images of disparate objects and events that are supposed to consti-
tute an unseen whole. Such an enumeration of perceptible parts no more
defines an organization than a parts-list defines an automobile.
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Reification
Our belief in organizations is sustained by our natural tendency to reify.
Reification occurs when an arrangement of parts (a relation) is taken to
be an integral whole (an object). Unlike objects such as ’dog’ and ’beer
can’, which can be perceived and described qualitatively (e.g. by their
colour, weight, shape, etc.) and which can be illustrated by instances or
representations (e.g. drawings, figures, photographs), the ’organization’
cannot be perceived or described qualitatively, and can be illustrated
only by its constituent parts and relations. This is reflected in the ways
organization is defined (see Table 1 for examples). Sometimes the organ-
ization is defined as an arrangement or system, typically of persons, activ-
ities, or roles (e.g., Barnard 1938; Katz and Kahn 1978; Simon 1976;
Weick 1979). Sometimes it is defined by its functions or purposes (e.g.
Selznick 1957; Scott 1981), and sometimes as something that we just
know (e.g. Blau and Scott, 1962; March and Simon, 1958). In the diction-
ary, organization is defined as: ’A number of persons or groups having
specific responsibilities and united for a particular purpose’ (American
Heritage Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1985). Certainly, organizations are not




The organization is reified when it is treated as an entity. This ignores
the wide differences between an arrangement and a thing. Whereas the
one is an abstraction that specifies how other things (ideas or substances)
are related to one another, the other is a substance that is positioned in
time and space and that can be defined by its qualities. Failure to heed
these differences shows up in age-old conundrums of organization iden-
tity. What happens to the organization when a part of it is divested, or
when a part of it goes home at night? What happens when its parts are
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replaced’? Is it the same organization, or a new one’? More pointedly,
what happens when the replaced parts are reassembled elsewhere (as
happens with baseball teams on Old-timer’s Days, and is beginning to
happen with old rock and roll bands)? Which is the genuine organization,
the one that persisted or the one that was reconstituted’? Such problems
of identity arise when a relation or pattern is mistaken for an
entity.
Phantom Actions
Where there are doubts about organizations, there are doubts no less
about their actions. Organization theory is also silent about how organ-
izations behave and about how they are born, develop, and disintegrate
(Mohr 1982; Sandelands and Drazin 1989), and this is in spite of avowals
to the contrary, such as appear in descriptions of organizations as open-
systems adapting to environments (e.g. Katz and Kahn 1y78; Thompson
1967; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Helpful as the metaphor of organismic
adaptation has been, it neither reflects nor points to any process that can
be observed. At a close look, we find that the concept of adaptation,
which shoulders the main burden of explanation, does not name a defin-
ite series of actions or events, but rather only the fact that a process
exists which produces adapted organizations as its outcome (thus only
repeating the fact to be explained) (see Sandelands and Drazin 1989).
Adaptation may be an outcome of a process, but it is not itself a
process.
The problem of specifying action takes a somewhat different form in
microsociological theories of organization that focus on individual actors.
There the difficulty arises in describing how individual actions (which can
be specified) combine and compound to produce an organized whole.
Theory begins and ends with the oft-repeated but nonetheless vague
methodological principle that organization emerges from the actions of
individuals (e.g. Allport 1962: Axelrod 1984: Blau 1964: Drazin and San-
delands 1992; Durkheim 1933; Homans 1~67; Weick 1979). This idea,
like that of adaptation, does not name a definite process, but only the
notion that such a process exists. Again, what seems to be an objective
process turns out not to be.
There is no harm in saying that organizations are adapted, or that they
.’ have emerged. However, problems begin when these statements are
taken to signify actions or events as causes. As Ryle (1949) has pointed
out, words such as adaptation and emergence have the character of
achievements; they can be used to refer to processes and/or to the states
produced by processes. They are deceptive when used in explanation
because, by representing both the fact to be explained and the action
that does the explaining, they offer a purely semantic or linguistic connec-
tion in place of what is supposed to be an empirical connection. Achieve-
ment words become necessary to provide a sense of process, and a sense
of explanation, when no process is observed, and no explanation is forth-
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coming. As long as organizations are outside experience, descriptions of
their actions will likewise be outside experience.
Mistaken Metaphors
Because we lack direct experiences of organizations, it has been neces-
sary to conceptualize organizations in terms of other things which can be
experienced - such as machines, biological individuals, minds, garbage
cans, see-saws, or even psychic prisons. Such use of metaphors in organ-
ization studies can be read as an attempt to provide vicarious experience
of an entity which cannot be experienced.
According to some authors, the virtue in having so many metaphors is
that they add to understanding by calling attention to otherwise unappar-
ent aspects of the organization (Morgan 1986). We believe to the con-
trary, that they are misleading and counterproductive. Instead of high-
lighting similarities between two experienced objects, these metaphors
play upon the absence of experience by substituting for the organization
an image of a metaphorical object. There is no telling whether organiza-
tions resemble organisms, machines, garbage cans, or anything else,
because there no independent image or intuition of organization with
which to compare them. This problem is illustrated by contrasting the
organizational metaphor of organism with the astronomical metaphor of
the Big Dipper. Although these metaphors appear to function the same
way by giving observers tips about how to organize the facts before them,
they differ fundamentally in how they relate to the facts. Whereas it is
possible to point to the Big Dipper as a fact about the celestial world (to
which another person could reply: ’I don’t see any dipper’, or ‘It doesn’t
look a dipper to me’), it is not possible to point to an organism adapting
to its environment as a fact about the organizational world (or to have
the same sort of conversation about it). The latter ’fact’ cannot be
observed or contested in the same way.
Because organizations also differ from garbage cans, machines, organ-
isms, and minds, it is difficult to evaluate assertions that the latter are
metaphors. To wit, what does it mean to say that organizations are like
machines, when machines are made of cold, lifeless parts, and organiza-
tions are made of conscious, thinking, feeling people? Certainly organiza-
tions are not machine-like in every respect, and probably only in a very
few. This is no less a problem with metaphorical comparisons across types
of human systems; for example, when generalizing from small groups to
large, complex ones. Differences in size and complexity often betoken
qualitative differences as well. Even the most obvious qualities of small
groups, such as identity, order, meaning, control, or unitary culture, may
be absent or undiscernible in large organizations. Indeed, it was on this
basis that Van Maanen and Barley (1985) argued against the concept of
corporate culture, maintaining that if such a thing existed, it is beyond
the pale. They argue, both on substantive and methodological grounds,
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that it is better to focus instead on sub-groups whose cultures can be
observed and studied.
Without the discipline of direct perceptive experience, we are prone to
confuse organizations with the metaphors that are intended to illumine
them. This confusion of map and territory can find us inhabiting a meta-
phorical world that is out of touch with the real world (which may be
why these metaphors seem so apt; to us, they are the territory). This can
be seen particularly in the conduct of research. For example, under the
spell of the metaphor of organism, phenomena of organization change
and development are investigated as instances of organizations adapting
to environments. Inquiries are made of how organizations perceive their
environments and how they adjust to them based on their perceptions.
Thus, the metaphor is integral to the formulation of the research and is
built into the questions that are asked. As a result, the metaphor is
never questioned, much less put to test. In view of its rather blatant
anthropomorphizing, there is surprisingly little doubt about whether
organizations can do such things as perceive or adjust to environ-
ments.
Similar difficulties beset psychological metaphors, such as that of
decision-making. Theories of microeconomics and strategic management
propose that organizations, in the persons of their executive leaders (see
e.g. Child 1982; Hambrick and Mason 1983), ’choose’ among alternative
structures or behaviours. In more sociological theories of the population
ecology of organizations, this metaphor takes the form of natural selec-
tion - whereby organization environments ’decide’ (’rationally’, we are
told) which forms of organization shall prosper or perish (see e.g.
Hannan and Freeman 1977). So strong is the pull of this metaphor, that
it is rarely asked whether or how such decisions are actually ’made’.
Yet, in many instances, actions are taken without any consideration of
alternatives. Just because alternatives to an event or course of action can
be imagined does not mean that any are considered, or that a ’decision’
is made between them. Although the language of ’decision-making’ (and
indeed of ’mind’ generally) can be applied to actions, it need not
be.
The crucial point, too often overlooked, is that metaphors are always
misleading to one degree or another. Metaphorical comparison is danger-
ous when it is uncritical, when it is undisciplined by experiences with
the objects or actions that are compared. Metaphor is a legitimate and
indispensable tool of science when it is used to identify pattern amidst
observations - that is, when it points to something that is visible but
undiscerned (e.g. a pattern of stars in the case of the Big Dipper). It is
an illegitimate tool of science, however, when it supplies not only the
pattern but its contents as well.
An Insistent Doubt
Doubt about organizations and their actions has had a corrosive effect
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on efforts to mount a science of organizations. Allport (1962) argued
that in the absence of direct perceptive experience, even seemingly unim-
peachable groups such as the United States Congress, or the University,
should be regarded as fictions, and not genuine scientific facts. To say
that such entities declare war or play football games is but a manner of
speaking (albeit often a convenient one), not a settled truth. Such talk,
he argued, rests upon an error of hypostasization in which an object that
cannot be denoted is treated as if it could be denoted. For example, he
notes that the Congress of the United States:
... has actual denotational reference only at a step that is lower down in the
natural hierarchy than the level to which it is presumed to refer. Its referent is
encounterable only at the level of individuals and their actions. Ought we not,
therefore, to observe the acts of the individuals and base our generalizations
upon them ... rather than attempt to describe what Congress is said to do? If
we were to set ourselves to study Congress and &dquo;its&dquo; actions, would we not be
starting our investigation by choosing as its object something that cannot check
us to tell us whether in experiencing it we are actually experiencing something,
and that cannot tell us where this &dquo;something&dquo; leaves off and some other object
begins? How, with such criteria omitted at the very start, could it be claimed
that the social sciences are empirical?’ (p. 5).
A similar doubt about organizations has led ethnomethodologists such
as Garfinkel and Hilbert to the concept of the local as the only acceptable
domain for scientific investigation. Hilbert (1990) summarizes the ethno-
methodological critique and approach as follows: .
... the here-and-now of observed data ought not to be allowed to stand in
proxy for &dquo;unseen&dquo; phenomena or patterns independently theorized as necessit-
ies, certainly not patterns that invoke imagery with their pieces linked together
and stretching off into hypothetical space. The approach calls for a more problem-
atic relation between multiple observations than simply glossing them into cat-
egories that fit into a logically prearranged theory’ (p. 7y7). -
These questions about the prospects for an organization science could be
removed with observations that verify the properties or actions attributed
to organizations. However, short of this, the concept of organization has
the ambiguous status of an idea; perhaps one that names an object that
others could agree to, but perhaps, instead, one that names a figment of
the imagination. With organizations, as with everything else, seeing is
believing and it is the best place for a science to begin.
For the would-be scientist, the challenge posed by being unable to see
organizations can be compared to that posed by a large jigsaw puzzle
that comes without a guiding picture of the whole. Such a jigsaw puzzle
would find us perpetually lost in one region or another, in a vain search
for similar appearing pieces to assemble. If the puzzle happened to be a
landscape (though we would have no way of knowing), we might get as
far as assembling regions of blue sky, clouds, fields, trees, or perhaps
flowers. But no farther. We would never know if similar pieces made up
a single region or many (e.g. one cloud or many), or how to coordinate
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dissimilar regions (indeed, it might never occur to us to try, for these
would seem separate puzzles, i.e. organizations unto themselves). Nor
would it do any good to focus on pieces that bridge between regions,
because there is no telling, without a concept of the whole, whether they
are truly boundary pieces or rather mottled pieces belonging to a region
of their own. In desperation, we might look to other puzzles for guiding
pictures of the whole (e.g. a portrait, still-life, or city-scape). Even
though such pictures would be misleading (because they belong to other
puzzles), we could not know this (because we are lost anyway) and for
a time at least we would be grateful for having our hopes restored. Surely
this is no way to solve a puzzle, or to build a theory of organ-
ization.
Organizations and Science
Scientific theorizing is a form of intellectual life that juxtaposes seeing
and saying. It is the perplexing art of explaining experience. It is per-
plexing because there is no simple basis for coordinating experiences and
explanations, the two are linguistically incommensurable. It is an art,
because the criteria for a good theory are largely aesthetic. Even though
experiences do not literally have causes or reasons, scientific theory pur-
ports to say what they are. Apples do not fall to earth because of gravity;
they fall to earth and we call this gravity. Socrates is not mortal because
he is a man; he is mortal and we attribute this to his being a man. As
we show below, the facts of experience bear a paradoxical relation to
the principles that are invoked to explain them.
Language Games and Science
Experiences and explanatory principles have different uses, and therefore
different meanings. Whereas experiences predicate a subject (who does
the experiencing), explanatory concepts do not. The experience of a red
apple implies a perceiving subject, but the concept of a gravitational
force that brings the apple to earth does not. By being experienced, the
red apple is substantiated in a way that the force of gravity is not. The
apple can be pointed to and verified by others. This contrasts with the
force of gravity which cannot be experienced directly, and for this reason
cannot be made into an object. Rather, gravity must be inferred from the
collateral evidence of its supposed consequences (e.g., mass attraction, a
feeling of weight).
Experiences and explanatory concepts also differ in their susceptibility
to reasoning. Explanatory concepts are the stuff of logical reasoning and,
indeed, are the medium in which such reasoning takes place. In contrast,
it is impossible to reason logically with experiences. Whereas we can
deduce that Socrates is mortal from antecedent knowledge that Socrates
is a man and that all men are mortal, we cannot deduce the experience
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of Socrates being mortal from the experience of Socrates being a man and
all men being mortal. Aside from the fact that there are no experiences of
humanness and mortality to be had, they could not function as logical
elements in any case - and this because they are not the sorts of things
that one can reason oneself into. One experience cannot be deduced
from another.
Following Wittgenstein (1953), it is possible to view experiences and
explanatory concepts as elements of distinct language games. This con-
ception of language games reminds us that ideas have different uses and
purposes and that they function in different linguistic environments
(hence the metaphor of ’games’). This conception also reminds us that,
because of these differences, ideas can sometimes be difficult to integ-
rate, or even incommensurable. According to Wittgenstein, many of the
problems of philosophical analysis are actually problems of the coordina-
tion of language concepts that have widely disparate backgrounds and
histories.
One of the charms and fascinations of science is that it attempts to marry
the language games of experience and explanation in spite of the difficult-
ies that this sometimes produces. This is why its truths are never settled,
but are always open to criticism and debate. Theory never quite explains
experience, and experience never quite proves theory. This is the key to
science’s dynamism. When it tends to much toward theoretical system,
it is criticized for abandoning experience; and when it tends too much
towards experience, it is criticized for being theoretically vacuous. Like
marriages of other kinds, this marriage of language games never quite
succeeds, but is somehow satisfying enough.
Language Games and Organization Science
The concept of language games suggests that an important impediment
to organization science has been that its principal concept - organiza-
tion - does not participate equally in the two language games of experi-
ence and explanation. As we have seen, there is no experiential or
perceptive concept of organization to go along with the many and varied
theoretical concepts of organization. The negative result is that there is
no constructive interplay between theory and experience, no agreement
about what should be theorized, and no concern for operationalization
and empirical testing. We don’t know what organization theory is about,
much less whether it is true.
The loss of theoretical discipline that comes from not having experiences
of organization to work with is perhaps most apparent in cases where
theoretical concepts have been borrowed from more established sciences.
A good example of this is the theory of evolution by natural selection,
borrowed from biology. Within biology, the interplay of theory and per-
ceptive experience is clear. For example, it is well-illustrated by Gould’s
( 1977) essay on the natural history of the Irish Elk. First identified as a
species by Cuvier in 1812, this animal is famous for its large size and
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particularly for its enormous antlers (which attained widths in excess of
12 feet). As Gould details, this giant deer (it was misnamed an Elk
because of its size) created scientific controversy by raising doubts about
the basic principle of natural selection. Anti-Darwinists fastened upon
this creature as proof against the idea that evolutionary changes are
adaptive, and for the contrary idea that these changes proceed in a fixed
direction, whether adaptive or not. In their view, the Irish Elk perished
because its antlers became too large. Alternatively, Huxley and others
conceded that large antlers may not have been adaptive, but defended
the principle of natural selection by linking antler size to body size, which
was an adaptive advantage (the principle of allometry). Also rising in
defense of natural selection was Gould himself, who argued oppositely
that large antlers actually provided a selective advantage. The large ant-
lers of the male, Gould argued, doubled as a highly visible symbol of
status in sexual selection by females and as a device for self-protection
from other males competing for dominance. According to Gould, the
Irish Elk perished for more prosaic reasons of climatic changes.
We see in this example how the theory of natural selection interacts with
experiences (based on the fossil record) to generate a reason and basis
for scientific inquiry. The confrontation of the two offers a basis for
testing and modifying theory (such as by introducing Huxley’s hypothesis
of allometry, or Gould’s notions of sexual selection and protected domin-
ance contests). It also offers leads for expanding the scope of experience
(such as by looking at the ratio of body size and antler size to test allome-
try ; by looking more closely at the fossil record to see if the antlers could
have functioned as Gould proposed).
By contrast, there is no comparable interplay between the theory of
natural selection and experiences in population studies of organizations.
This example is from Freeman (1982: 7):
’Suppose we were studying the populations of men’s liberal arts colleges and
women’s liberal arts colleges during the 196U’s and 1970’s. We would see that
the women’s colleges were dying at a much more rapid rate than the men’s
colleges. The question that comes immediately to mind is why do the men’s
schools compete successfully, whereas the women’s schools do not? A difference
of some importance is the fact that men’s colleges are more likely to be endowed
than are women’s colleges.... Obviously, it is always better to have a large
endowment than a small one. And just as obviously, when times are difficult
more organizations of all kinds will fail than when the funding environment is
munificent. It is the combination of the two that is most interesting for its effect
on the mix of colleges observed in the early 1980’s.’
These appear to be similar dynamics of natural selection, but the appear-
ance is misleading because it is based on metaphor, and not on strict
analogy. As compared to the example of the Irish Elk, where the mech-
anism of natural selection explains the net mortality of a concretely
experienced animal in terms of its specific characteristics operating in a
specific environment; in this example, natural selection explains only the
net mortality of characteristics which are claimed to be those of a form
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of organization in an environment, but which cannot be contested as
such. Here, it is not the fate of organizations that is explained, but rather
the fate of certain characteristics, such as gender of the student body and
size of endowment. The organization form is not given before the fact,
but is defined after the fact - in Freeman’s phrase, as a ’bag of variables
that covary as a result of differential net mortality’ (Freeman, 1982: 9,
emphasis added). The principle of natural selection does not explain
organization form; instead, it defines it for us, and as a definition, this
principle cannot be tested. As compared to its more advanced cousin in
biology, the theory of organizational selection does not involve the same
tension between theory and experience and it is not scientific in the same
way.
The comparison of these two cases makes bold the point that scientific
inquiry proceeds differently when guided by experience. When all eyes
are focused on the phenomena, there are discussions about what is
observed, about how to look at it, and about what aspects or properties
are significant theoretically. Theory develops alongside observation, and
relates to it as a kind of introspection, literally as ’in-sight’. Moreover,
because the grounds for endorsing one theory or another are apparent,
they can be discussed and debated. Theoretical advances are occasioned,
not by bully arguments (although rhetoric is important), but by the feel-
ing of satisfaction that comes from a new theory that is more sympathetic
to experience. However, when there is no experience to discipline con-
ceptualization, alternative theories are left to scrap among themselves
for status. The result is a reform-school mentality of every theory for
itself. Thus, within organization studies, functionalists argue that struc-
turalists leave out purpose, and they, in turn, maintain that functionalists
presume too much. Strategy theorists take both to task for belittling
individual action and choice, while ecologists complain that individual
agency is overstated, and that organizations are subject instead to power-
ful inertial forces which limit choices. This is not a proud contest of
strength in fitting the facts, so much as unseemly conflict of weakness and
name-calling. Whereas we might want to call this science, it is actually of
a different order entirely - something more akin to religion, or better
perhaps, superstition (literally, a clash of ideas that ’stand over’ the
facts).
Beyond Language Games
The question arises of how theories of organization could prosper in the
absence of substantiating experience. Here, again, the concept of lang-
uage games offers a clue. We believe that the estrangement of organiza-
tion theory from experience is partly the result of taking the idea of
language games too seriouslv - that is, of believing that because explan-
atory concepts and experience concepts can be seen to participate in
different language games, there is no chance or point in trying to relate
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the two. Taken to its extreme, this is to believe that the two are logically
incommensurable.
This idea has a long and venerable history that can be traced back at
least to Plato, who maintained that theoretical facts are ideal and that
they can be glimpsed only by reasoning beyond the fallible evidence of
the senses. This idea was given further impetus by Descartes who divided
the world into an objective, material realm (matter), and a subjective,
mental realm (mind) - and in so doing saddled philosophy ever since
with the burden of relating the two. Today, this idea takes many forms.
It is written large in schools of rationalism that deduce new theoretical
concepts from old ones, without so much as a sideways glance at experi-
ence. It is expressed in schools of psychology that conceptualize the
development of the mind as a process of learning how to go beyond the
information given (e.g. Bruner 1974). This idea is reflected in a kind of
statistical imperialism, too often found in social science, which pro-
nounces quantitative statistical analyses superior to ’noisy’ and ’ungen-
eralizable’ experiences of single cases. On this basis, sophisticated statist-
ical analyses (e.g. factor analysis, LISREL) are applied without regard
for the quality of the data used, or for the logical issues involved when
generalizing from groups of cases to individual ones.
Few ideas have created more confusion or done more harm to our under-
standing of ourselves and the way we know things. This idea suggests
that since theoretical concepts and perceptive experiences are essentially
different, picking one is somehow tantamount to taking sides against
the other. Yet, Wittgenstein’s essential insight about language games is
precisely that they are ’games’ and not settled truths. Philosophy, he
wrote, is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language.
Although theoretical concepts and perceptive experiences can be circum-
scribed within different language games, they need not be. It is also
possible and desirable to see them in an alternative way as related within
a common language game. Seeing them in a second way multiplies our
understanding, and makes it possible to understand how science could
purport to marry the two.
An alternative, which we are hardly the first to suggest, is to see theoret-
ical concepts and perceptive experiences as developing from essentially
the same act of mind, and as differing mainly in degree of abstraction
(experiences being closer to sensation and theoretical facts farther away).
Instead of distinct types, we can imagine a continuum that marks a single
route to understanding, with perceptive experiences being nearer the
departure point and theoretical concepts nearer the destination. This
alternative thus reconceptualizes our usual ideas of both theory and
experience. Theoretical concepts become part experiential and percept-
ive experiences become part theoretical, and there is no clear break or
demarcation between the two, but only shadings of emphasis. A signific-
ant consequence of this view is that it makes curious our usual idea that
experiences are more subjective than theoretical concepts. Rather, it
suggests that the latter actually involve more of the mind in their making
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and thus have more of the subject in them. Although the thing-like
appearance of theoretical concepts may suggest objectivity, when we
follow these ’disembodied’ ideas back to their sources, we go back upon
a process of abstraction that is as subjective as can be.
This view of theory and experience led Dewey (1958: 8) to reserve a
special meaning for the word ’experience’ because it ’recognizes in its
primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and
object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality’. Similarly,
James (1904) described experience as ’double-barrelled’, noting that it
encompasses the single-barrelled words of both ’thing’ and ’thought’.
Experience refers both to perceiver and fact perceived and conceives
them not as two, but as an indivisible one. On this view, there are not
theoretical facts and experiences, but only experiences which, from cer-
tain vantage points, might provisionally be called ’facts’. This concept of
experience (which appears in contemporary linguistic philosophy as the
concept of ’seeing as’, see Wittgenstein 1953; Hanson 1969) forges a
connection between experience and theory, and grounds the latter firmly
in the former. Its main advantage for purposes of analysis is that it does
not worry about giving undue emphasis to one or the other, or about
how to put them back together - which, as Dewey drolly puts in, is
something that not even all the king’s men can do.
For the purposes of this paper, this alternative view of theory and experi-
ence is significant because it compels us to keep a steady eye on the
phenomena in question. If it is a mistake to envisage sharp lines between
theoretical concepts and experiences, then we must insist that all concepts
be part theoretical and part experiential. Although lines between the two
can be drawn, they come at the cost of neglecting experience as the
mainspring of theoretical insight. As Barzun (1983: 63) has forcefully
argued, to keep hold of concrete experience is to value theoretical con-
cepts so much as to be fastidious in their use and demanding about their
quality. Without experience to guide it, theory can stray too far from the
real and become lost in the web of its own logic. Further, this alternative
view reminds us that the landmark achievements of science have always
been occasioned by advances in the capacity to experience - e.g. Gal-
ileo’s telescope, electron microscopy, nuclear accelerators and bubble
chambers, computer simulation, and mathematics. With deeper and
broader experiences come new insights (literally, new ’seeing intos’), and
more fruitful and felicitous theoretical abstractions. Finally, this view
suggests caution when interpreting recent arguments that organization
theories can be improved by insisting on more rigorous formulations,
such as by mathematics (e.g. Camerer 1985). Mathematics offers power-
ful means of expression when its concepts can be checked against experi-
ence, but, when it is pursued as an end unto itself, mathematics also
can be an evasion of experience, as sometimes happens in neo-classical
economics.
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Prospects For a Science of Organizations
The discussion above can be adduced to support opposed conclusions
about how organization studies should proceed - one, despairing and
destructive, the other, hopeful and constructive. The first conclusion is
that a scientific theory of organizations is not practicable and that the
sooner this is recognized the sooner research attention can shift to more
productive questions. This conclusion recalls well-known and well-
spoken calls for theories grounded in experience (e.g. Glaser and Strauss
1967), and for theories of the middle-range that conform more closely
to experience (e.g. Merton 1967). However, since this conclusion is
depressing and leaves little more to say, we note it in passing while
remaining mindful of its disquieting message.
The second and more hopeful conclusion is that more work is needed to
bring organizations within the compass of experience and within the
range of scientific abstraction. This admonition is perhaps more welcome
because it gives hope to our theoretical ambitions. With a close enough
look at organizations it may yet be possible to establish a secure scientific
basis for organization theory.
Expanding the Scope of Experience: New Sensitivities
. Insofar as theory thematizes an experienced world, it is served best by
the most penetrating and encompassing experiences. The pressing need
of organization theory is for experiences of organizations qua organiza-
. tions - that is, for experiences of the whole, and not just of its presumed
parts. To satisfy this need, new sensitivities are required. Ways must
be found to bring organizations within the limited compass of human
perception and reason. Just as cellular biology awaited the invention of
the microscope, and atomic physics the accelerator, so too a true study
of organizations awaits the development of instruments capable of
bringing its subject within human perceptibility.
It is hardly possible to exaggerate our present ignorance, or the scale of
the task we face. In view of the mammoth size, diversity, and dispersion
, of large organizations, the problem of domesticating them within the
bounds of human sensibility is daunting. This problem is compounded
by the fact that organizations can be described either in physical terms
of matter and motion, or in mental terms of information, meaning, and
feeling. Whereas the physical bearing of organizations may be easy to
understand (if we can get enough of a look at organizations to see it),
the mental or symbolic bearing of organizations is sure to be more diffi-
cult to comprehend. Physical fact is but one piece of the puzzle and is
joined by all the nuances and ambiguities of human nature, language,
culture, mythology, and history. Thus, to experience organizations in
their totality requires also a high and perhaps impossible degree of
anthropological awareness.
Daunting as the project may be, there are hopeful signs of progress.
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Although it remains to be seen what new sensitivities may emerge, and
what kinds of instruments will bear them, there are intriguing intimations
in contemporary research. One is the ongoing effort to develop compre-
hensive maps of organizations - for example, as networks of action and
interaction, or as networks of causal reasoning and meaning (e.g. Burt
1982; Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst 1977). For example, Bougon et al.
(1977) have mapped the process by which the members of an organiza-
tion (the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra) established a common concept of a
task and a division of labour (a reading of a new piece of music). When
presented in visual form, either on paper or with computer assisted
imaging, these maps enhance our visual powers by condensing large tracts
of organized activity into a single surveyable region. In recent years espe-
cially, the comprehensiveness of such network studies has been greatly
expanded by the availability of high-speed computation. Although there
remain questions about whether an organization can be glimpsed from
studies of relational networks (e.g., would this constitute a new, com-
_ puter-assisted form of reification?) and about the sensitivity and resolving
power of current techniques (e.g. of measurement, aggregation
procedures), this line of research offers a reason for hope.
Another intimation of things to come is the more recent effort to repro-
duce aspects and phenomena of organization by means of computer simu-
lation (e.g. Axelrod 1984; Masuch and LaPotin 1989). These studies take
a different approach to understanding complex organizations. Instead of
trying to map the elements of organizations, they propose to learn about
, organizations by reproducing their capacities and tendencies. For
example, Axelrod (1984) has developed computer simulations (based on
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game) which show how one important
quality of organization, the norm of cooperation, can emerge among
independently motivated and self-interested actors. Although these
studies do not look to experience as the immediate basis for theoretical
abstraction, they do call upon it after the fact when comparing theory
against known characteristics of organizations. This resembles the
approach taken by cognitive scientists who investigate the human mind
by creating artificial forms of intelligence. Whether this approach will
prove any less controversial as a mode of inquiry into organizations (as
studies of artificial intelligence are of human intelligence) remains to be
seen.
If we add to these methods others that might prove illuminating (e.g.
comprehensive ethnographies, or perhaps organization stimulations, or
even experiments), or if we learn how to combine methods - for
example, simulation with network analysis - the possibilities of product-
ive insight may be multiplied. Although their promise remains to be seen,
some of today’s methods could conceivably do for the field of organiza-




Expanding the Scope of Experience: Wider Sensitivities
The salvation promised by new instruments should not, however, distract
or deter us from developing our native ability to experience organiza-
. tions. Perhaps there are hidden or unobvious realms of intuition or feel-
. ing by which we can know organizations, without special pros-
theses.
It is perhaps not too farfetched to suggest that even though organizations
cannot be seen, they can be felt. Perhaps there are experiences of organ-
ization at the level of feeling that can be grasped by taking a different
. , kind of ’look’ at them. Maybe there is an experientiable concept of organ-
ization akin to the cozy ’we’ feeling that is sometimes noted of small
groups (see Sandelands and St. Clair 1992) or to the feeling of ’commun-
itas’ that has been identified with tribal or religious gatherings (Turner
. 1974). To know organizations in this way would require the perceptive
sensitivity of the novelist or poet. It would require an intellectual open-
ness that is not bound to prior conceptions, and an emotional openness
that finds room for experiences that are probably more diffuse, intuitive,
and perhaps more visceral than those that appear to the senses.
Indeed, it is an affecting lesson of the humanities that its intellectual
giants are profound observers of social life. Their genius is their ability
. 
to see things in surprising ways - ways which are recognizable, yet
.= recognizably different from our own. An obvious difference is that the
poet or novelist typically looks at things with different purposes in mind
and from a different point of view. More so than the ordinary person,
they are attuned to feeling qualities that escape ordinary attention or
. awareness, and more so than the average reader of this journal. they are
. not as enamoured or prejudiced by prior conceptions of organ-
ization.
Within organization studies, this sort of perspective is probably more
available to newcomers to the field who, because they are unschooled,
may be able to ’see’ (feel) aspects of organizations that are hidden from
&dquo; 
more experienced eyes. They may have more of the innocence sought
out by phenomenologists in their method of wessellchau. which begins
with pure experience, and then builds concepts by looking for invariants
amidst the ongoing flux. For established organization theorists, for whom
’ 
innocence is long lost, a fresh perspective can perhaps be emulated by
switching among alternative preconceptions. This at least is the reasoning
sometimes given by theorists who advocate taking multiple perspectives
in the study of organizations (e.g. Morgan 1986).
By making common cause with poets, novelists, or novices, we do not
> mean to suggest that these people can see things that the established
, organization scientist cannot. We mean only to urge a methodological
point; namely, that the way we see can determine what we see. We
. would in no way deny the scientist’s charge that the reports of novices
or litterateurs are loose, subjective, unrigorous, and often unreplicable.
In the best examples of both, there is nothing obvious or even consistent
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in what the author is trying to say. However, this must be weighed against
the litterateur’s charge that science is dry, intellectual to a fault, and
guilty of fragmenting the whole beyond recognition and feeling. As the
poet Ezra Pound once commented, the superiority of poetry lies in the
fact that it can evoke a mental-emotional complex of imagery and feeling
in an instant of time, and that is one thing analytical methods just can’t
deliver. The glory of the novel, according to one of its contemporary
masters, Milan Kundera, is that it is equipped ’to express and convey a
certain kind of essential truth that the methods of analytic rationalism
are forced to ignore’. This essential truth is the ’wisdom of uncertainty’
and the ’inescapable relativity and ambiguity of human affairs’. Because
the novel’s essence is not clarity and simplicity, but ambiguity and com-
plexity, every novel says to the reader: ’Things are not as simple as you
think.’ It is just here that we come upon the novel’s eternal truth. More-
over, as against a scientific modernity that has ’propelled man into the
tunnels of specialized knowledge’, the novel at its best enables us to see
ourselves and the world as a whole.
It is somewhat along these lines that conflict arises within organization
studies about the legitimacy and need for methods like those used in the
humanities (e.g. clinical observation, case study, ethnography, impres-
sionist tales) (Zald 1993). Sometimes this conflict is rehearsed in debates
about the virtues of qualitative versus quantitative research methods.
However, too often these debates descend to pleas by proponents of the
former for a begrudged acceptance by proponents of the latter. We
believe the debate is mistaken. When we focus squarely on perceptive
experience as the basis for theoretical abstraction, we see, along with
Glassie (quoted in Harper 1987), that there is no opposition among
methods, between science and art, organization studies and the humanit-
ies. Rather, we are united in:
... but one enterprise. We could call it historical ethnography or local history
or folklore in context or the sociology of the creative act or the ecology of
consciousness - the potential for flashy neologism seems boundless - but what-
ever its name, study is distorted and reality is mangled when disciplines harden
into ideology. categories freeze into facts, and the sweet, terrible wholeness of
life is dismembered for burial.
... if work is good, old categories will slip and shift, and then melt away as we
find the place where social science joins the humanities, where art and culture
and history, time and space, connect, where theoretical and empirical studies
fuse.’
To be sure, these ideas for enhancing the experientiability of organiza-
tions are preliminary, ad hoc, and hardly suggest the force of a break-
through. We suspect that if a way to experience organizations comes, it
will come as a revolution in methods, and not as an incremental improve-
ment over existing techniques. The main reason for including suggestions
is to sustain the hope that a way out of the problem of experience can
be found. For the alternative to hope is despair.
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Conclusion
’In the modern world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been
replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is divorced from the concrete contem-
plation of the complete facts.’ (Whitehead 1925)
Whitehead spoke thus of the danger to science of losing touch with con-
crete experience. A science is fully alive and creative when wide-eyed
and involved; when it sees, touches, hears, tastes, and feels. Intellectual
celibacy, cut off from sensuous involvement, is a shame not a
virtue.
To make the study of organizations more like a natural science means,
above all, grounding concepts and theory in communicable and verifiable
experiences. This, as Homans (1950) points out, is an exacting discipline.
One must:
’ 
... habitually catch himself as he mouths one of the big abstractions and ask:
What does this mouthful mean in terms of actual human behavior that someone
has seen and reported? ... The question is devastating and we do not ask it
often enough.... The great point is to climb down from the big words of social
science, at least as far as common sense observation. Then, if we wish, we can
start climbing up again, but this time with a ladder we can depend on.’ (p.
10)
If the study of organizations is ever to be a natural science, organization
researchers would do well to have the same respect for Nature that the
physical and life scientists have. For these natural scientists, it is as much
an axiomatic belief that nature is cleverer, subtler and more intricate
than the human intellect can possibly comprehend, as it is that nature
obeys certain, intellectually discerned rules or laws. Nature converses
civilly with reason and logic, but yields her secrets only to perceptive
experience. Inquiry must begin with the latter.
Science is justifiably admired for speaking clearly and precisely. It is
admired even more for questioning everything not vouchsafed by experi-
ence. As Durkheim put it, ’science is conscience raised to its highest
degree’. Such is the conscience called for by Lewin (1947) when he
insisted that concepts of social science be founded upon concrete experi-
ence, or not at all. Such is the conscience needed today by organization
theory if it is to become scientific in this sense.
Note *We are grateful to Tom D’Aunno, Jane Dutton. Sunder Narayan, Rick Price, Anat Rafa-
eli, Karl Weick, and the editor and reviewers of this journal, for their constructive sugges-
tions on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
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